• La Ue vuole interrompere le relazioni diplomatiche con la Turchia

    Il Consiglio dell’UE ha votato il 15 luglio la sospensione delle attività diplomatiche tra UE e Turchia in risposta a «nuove e continue» attività sulla costa di Cipro da parte del Paese asiatico. Almeno due navi turche hanno trivellato petrolio e gas nelle acque territoriali cipriote; il governo turco rivendica diritti di esplorazione sulla regione mentre l’Ue ha più volte invitato Ankara a non proseguire tali attività.

    A seguito della decisione europea, il ministero degli Esteri turco ha rilasciato una dichiarazione in cui ha respinto le conclusioni del Consiglio e lo ha accusato di mostrare pregiudizi ingiustificati a favore di Cipro. «Non dovremmo prendere sul serio le decisioni dell’Ue» ha dichiarato il ministro degli Esteri Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu al sito di notizie turco Habertürk: «Abbiamo già tre navi lì e ne stiamo inviando una quarta» ha aggiunto.

  • The price of meddling with Turkish monetary policy gets dearer

    The firing of Turkey’s Central Bank Governor on Saturday takes place in a relatively positive economic context for emerging economies. Still, the heavy-handed interference by President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in monetary policy appears to be stripping Turkey of economic opportunity, driving prominent members of his political movement to jump ship.
    As the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England lower interest rates and the European Central Bank braces for the second wave of quantitative easing, institutional investors are once again turning to emerging economies for yield. Carry trade has returned as investors borrow in low yielding western jurisdictions to invest in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia, Colombia, and Turkey.
    Exactly a week ago, Turkey announced plans to sell $1bn dollar-denominated five-year bonds in the fourth bond action of its kind this year. This looked like a good investment, as Turkish dollar-denominated bonds are expected to yield 6.65%, that is, a spread of around 4.9% higher than US Treasuries, which is extremely attractive in a zero or negative yield environment.
    The risk appeared low. Turkey’s inflation rate saw its biggest drop in months in June. Consumer prices increased by “merely” 15.7% in June, year on year, compared with 18.7% in May and 25% in September 2018. But firing the Governor of the Bank of Turkey changes the political calculation.
    Anyone betting on the appreciation of the Turkish Lira lost 2% on Monday and the message is clear: the risk is an erratic politics as much as deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals. This political risk is weighing more heavily on the image of the government, especially following the resignation of former Economy Minister Ali Babacan from the ranks of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on Monday.
    The 52-year-old Babacan is a founding member of AKP and made no secret that the firing of the Central Bank Governor was the trigger of this decision. Babacan was the chief negotiator in EU accession talks in the 2000s, the architect of Turkey’s fast-paced economic growth at the time, and well-liked by international investors. He is only the latest in a long stream of high-profile defections, which include former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu and former President Abdullah Gul, who have taken a back seat in politics. The difference is that Mr Babacan may not be leaving but planning to remain as a political challenger.

  • Istanbul’s mayoral election was a vote of confidence for democracy in Turkey

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his political party, the AKP, will be in a period of transition after having suffered an electoral defeat at the hands of opposition figure Ekrem Imamoğlufor control of Istanbul after a re-run of the city’s mayoral election.

    Erdogan had previously said that “whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey” and with nearly all ballots counted, Imamoğlu had captured 54% of the vote, far ahead of his to his opponent, former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, who received 45% of the ballots cast. Imamoğlu’s margin of victory was a huge increase on what he achieved in an earlier election held in March that was later annulled after the AKP accused the opposition of voting irregularities.

    The decision to re-run the vote was heavily criticised by Turkey’s Western allies and caused an uproar among domestic opponents who said that democracy in Turkey was under threat. The latest results, however, appear to have been a boon for the overall health of the democratic process in an overwhelmingly Muslim nation of more than 80 million people.

    Imamoğlu, of the secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP), won broad support in Istanbul, by far Turkey’s largest city as well as its cultural capital that was once the seat of government during the 500-year Ottoman Empire. Unlike in previous elections, the CHP did well in traditionally conservative parts of the city where the Islamist-rooted AKP had reigned supreme for the better part of the last 25 years.

    “In this city today, you have fixed democracy. Thank you Istanbul,” Imamoğlu told supporters. “We came to embrace everyone,” he said. “We will build democracy in this city, we will build justice. In this beautiful city, I promise, we will build the future.” Erdogan congratulated Imamoğlu for the victory and later wished him luck as mayor.

    A Council of Europe delegation said, despite some reported incidents of aggressive encounters with party supporters, noted that “the citizens of Istanbul elected a new mayor in a well-organised and transparent vote, albeit intense circumstances,” according to the delegation’s head, Andrew Dawson.

    The AKP’s support among pious and religiously conservative Turks helped it oversee a decade and a half of construction-fuelled economic growth which helped Erdoğan win an unprecedented number of national and local elections by wide margins. The ongoing economic recession and a financial crisis have eroded that has seen the national currency, the lira, lose much of its value over the last year saw support for Erdoğan dry up as voters appear to have also grown concerned about his ever-tighter control over the government.


  • EU considers freezing Customs Union negotiations with Turkey

    Amid growing concerns about the aggressive offshore drilling activities that are currently being carried out near the Cypriot coast by the Turkish government, the European Union is mulling putting Ankara’s accession chapters under discussion ahead of the European Council meeting in 20-21June,

    Turkey disputes the existence of an Exclusive Economic Zone that belongs to Cyprus. Instead, Turkey’s authoritarian President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claims he has the legal right to send exploration vessels in the are, a move that EU-member Cyprus says violates its sovereignty.

    According to the draft joint communique, the EU leaders are preparing “to respond appropriately and in full solidarity with Cyprus,” and to reiterate that the bloc condemns “Turkey’s continued illegal actions in the Eastern Mediterranean” while noting that “Turkey continues to move further away from the European Union”.

    The EU’s leaders plan to publicly declare that Turkey’s EU accession negotiations have come to a standstill and no further chapters in the accession process can be considered for opening or closing at this time, including the change of status of the Customs Union with the EU and visa liberalisation for Turkish passport holders.

    “No further work towards the modernisation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen,” the leaders are expected to say at the end of the week.

    The EU is also prepared to show Turkey that further escalation is possible if any illegal drilling continues. Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has already said that he may demand that the EU sanction Turkey because of Ankara’s continued violations of Cyrpus’ territorial waters.

    The dispute adds to a series of disagreements between the EU and Turkey in areas such as the rule of law and democratic standards, especially since a so-called failed coup against Erdoğan’s Islamist government in July 2016.

    Cyprus was split in 1974 into the EU-member Greek Cypriot south and the internationally unrecognised Turkish Cypriot north when Turkey invaded in response to a coup by local supporters of a formal union with Greece.

  • Per trovare la sua ‘quadra’ la Ue deve pensare anche a Cipro

    Mentre i governi dei Paesi della Ue si stanno febbrilmente consultando e scontrando sui nomi dei futuri commissari e aleggia, costante e incombente, il problema dell’immigrazione visto che addirittura vi è stata una denuncia, proprio contro l’Unione europea, al tribunale dell’Aja, la stessa Europa si trova, sul tema appunto dei migranti, a dovere dare conto dell’enorme quantità di denaro dato alla Turchia senza aver effettivamente verificato l’utilizzo di tale denaro a favore degli immigrati. Ma il problema Turchia non è rappresentato soltanto da questo, consiste anche nella situazione dell’isola di Cipro, che è membro della Ue, divisa dal 1974 tra Nord e Sud da un muro, da un filo spinato. La stessa capitale Nicosia è divisa da muraglioni di sacchi di sabbia. Da un lato ci sono i turchi, che in quella data l’hanno invasa, e dall’altro i greci-ciprioti. Nicosia sembra una città in guerra, è l’ultima capitale europea divisa in due da un muro. Le due realtà non comunicano con la stessa lingua né possono comunicare telefonicamente perché le due compagnie di telefonia mobile non si riconoscono e non hanno servizi in comune. Case abbandonate e distrutte sono ancora lì a raccontare una ferita non rimarginata e i militari camminano armati dietro al filo spinato: non si può né fotografare né riprendere. Nel 2004 Kofi Annan, segretario dell’Onu, aveva proposto una road map per la riunificazione ma tutto fallì e a nulla approdarono nemmeno i negoziati del 2014-2017.

    Certamente vi sono problemi più impellenti e di più vasta portata che l’Ue deve affrontare, ma anche questo di Cipro non può essere ignorato. Né può essere ignorato che quanto la Turchia ha fatto nel lontano 1974 dimostra ai giorni nostri, con gli atteggiamenti e le iniziative di Erdogan, che vi possono essere ancora pericoli per la stabilità.

  • Nuovi progressi per i rifugiati in Turchia

    Quando nel 2016 la Commissione europea decise di stanziare 6 miliardi di euro a favore dei rifugiati  in Turchia non poche furono le polemiche perché si vedeva in questa decisione una sorta di ricatto al quale l’Europa era sottoposta da Erdogan. Per sapere come quel finanziamento viene adoperato, periodicamente si svolgono degli incontri tra Commissione, rappresentai degli Stati membri dell’UE e la Turchia, come quello che si è svolto lo scorso 17 maggio in cui sono stati messi in evidenza i progressi fatti fino ad oggi. Sono in corso più di 80 progetti, infatti, destinati ai rifugiati e alle comunità di accoglienza, in particolare nel settore dell’istruzione e della salute. Più specificatamente sono state effettuate 5 milioni di consultazioni sanitarie con 178 centri di salute migranti attualmente operativi. Per il futuro, va menzionato in particolare  un contratto da 400 milioni di euro per continuare a sostenere i programmi d’istruzione e 50 milioni di euro destinati a sostenere le autorità turche in modo strutturale e ad agevolare l’integrazione dei rifugiati nella società turca. Soddisfazione per i risultati raggiunti e per gli impegni futuri è stata espressa dal Commissario europeo per l’Allargamento e la Politica di Vicinato, Johannes Hahn.

  • Turkey braces for regional elections amid growing polarisation

    Turkey is holding local and regional elections on 31 March in what polls suggest could see the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lose ground across all major urban centres, including Ankara and Istanbul.

    Observers have noted that the election is being seen by many a referendum of Erdogan’s Islamist rule.  As that question further polarises society, the opposition could find itself capturing several key elections in places where they’re had little success in recent years.

    The opposition-backed candidate running for mayor of Turkey’s capital Ankara, Mansur Yavas, said on Sunday that he is leading eight points ahead of the AKP-backed Mehmet Özhaseki.

    In an effort to draw attention from the country’s worsening economic situation, Erdogan has launched an all-out assault on the secular elements of society by leading a deeply divisive religious campaign where he has resorted to showing images of the Christchurch Mosque massacre and made suggestions that he plans to turn the former Byzantine basilica of Hagia Sofia back into a mosque, “so that everybody can visit it without charge.”

    The 1,500-year-old UNESCO heritage site, once the largest cathedral in the Christian world, has been a museum since 1935.

    AKP government ministers and dignitaries have ramped up the “West versus Turkey” rhetoric by saying they could resort to an old third-world tactic where they would question the election results if the AKP loses.

    Members of the opposition have been openly threatened with prosecution and imprisonment by Erdogan and AKP, with Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu accusing Nation Alliance candidates of links to terrorist organisations.

  • La Turchia nega l’accredito ai giornalisti stranieri prima delle elezioni di marzo

    Nemico e carceriere dei giornalisti il governo turco di Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a poche settimane dal voto si è rifiutato di accreditare 50 corrispondenti stranieri che intendevano coprire la tornata elettorale. I corrispondenti che lavorano da anni per Suddeutsche Zeitung, ZDF, Tagesspiegel e ARD non hanno ricevuto alcun pass per la stampa. Il fatto che così tanti giornalisti stranieri siano bloccati prima delle elezioni comunali del 31 marzo, in cui il partito al potere islamista AK si aspetta di perdere terreno, solleva nuove preoccupazioni sulla campagna in corso di Erdogan per distruggere l’indipendenza dei media in Turchia. L’edizione in lingua tedesca del quotidiano filo-governativo Sabah ha sostenuto il 5 marzo, senza fornire prove, che i giornalisti sono legati al chierico statunitense Fethullah Gulen, arcinemico di Erdogan. Dopi il colpo di stato fallito nel 2016, il governo turco ha spento 31 canali TV, 34 stazioni radio, chiuso cinque agenzie di stampa, 62 giornali, 19 riviste e ha cancellato centinaia di migliaia di dipendenti pubblici. La Germania ha avvertito i suoi cittadini che rischiano l’arresto per aver espresso opinioni in Turchia.

  • The Khashoggi Affair: Challenging US-Saudi Relations and the Stability of the Kingdom

    The Khashoggi affair, which is far from over, poses the most significant challenge to US-Saudi relations since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Thus far, the administration’s response reflects uncertainty and ambivalence, given its understanding that Riyadh’s conduct demands a response, versus its hope that it will not be forced to acknowledge the failure of its Middle East policy, which assigns Saudi Arabia a critical role, particularly in the efforts to contain Iran. The recent events have intensified the internal unrest that has marked the kingdom for some time, against the background of the confrontational conduct of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. It is important to prepare for a period of instability in the kingdom, and more important, for possible shocks to US-Saudi relations. Both these developments can be expected to impact directly and negatively on Israel’s interests, and on Israel’s ability to view Saudi Arabia as a viable partner in pursuing common goals.

    The Saudi statement that journalist Jamal Khashoggi died in the course of an altercation inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, and that the officials responsible, including senior Saudi officials, have been arrested and removed from their posts, was met with a positive initial reaction from US President Donald Trump. The White House, however, like other state leaderships around the world, has emphasized that the picture is not complete, and that the Saudis bear the burden of continuing the investigation and providing answers to many outstanding questions. Demands are also increasing for an independent international investigation of the matter. Parties in the West, including the US Secretary of Treasury, the Finance Ministers of Britain, Germany, and France, and the head of the International Monetary Fund, have refrained from taking part in the conference “The Future Investment Initiative”, which opened on October 23, 2018 under the auspices of the Crown Prince himself.

    The responses of President Trump and other US administration officials since the beginning of the incident have reflected their sense of being torn between an understanding that the Saudi conduct demands a response, and the hope that it will not be necessary to acknowledge the failure of the policy the US has pursued thus far vis-à-vis the kingdom, including the decision to place its hopes in Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS); this could well endanger interests that the President has defined as essential interests. They include:

    • The President’s Image: On the one hand, concern is mounting that the incident will cast a dark shadow over the president’s judgment. Newspaper reports have noted that behind closed doors, President Trump has stressed that the close relations between his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and the Saudi Crown Prince are a burden on US policy. The President and his administration understand that they are already taken for granted by the Saudi leadership, based on the assessment that Riyadh has them in its pocket, and that their response will help the kingdom overcome the impact of the incident. On the other hand, Trump has no interest in being perceived as a weak and hesitant leader.
    • Economic Issues: President Trump has repeatedly emphasized the price of harming Saudi investments in the United States, particularly in light of promises to purchase $110 billion in weapons (although there are doubts whether the deals in question will actually be implemented in full). The importance he assigns to this issue, and to the possible risks that would stem from imposing sanctions on Saudi Arabia, also figure in the context of the US mid-term elections (November 2018) and the desire to take advantage of the improved economic conditions in the United States as leverage to improve Republican candidates’ chances of being elected. With regard to the Saudi issue – as opposed to the issue of Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh – significant gaps exist between President Trump and leading Republican lawmakers considered close to the President, who are demanding a strong United States response to the Saudi actions.
    • Regional Policy: Even prior to the Khashoggi incident, questions emerged regarding Saudi Arabia’s ability to fulfill the central role the Trump administration had designated for it in advancing its efforts to contain and restrain Iran in the Middle East. In the United States, as in Israel, great hopes were pinned on Mohammad bin Salman, whom they regarded as a partner in the struggle against Iran and in the regional peace process. However, many in the United States now harbor far more limited expectations, particularly in light of their annoyance with Riyadh’s conduct in the war in Yemen, in the crisis vis-à-vis Qatar, and the temporary arrest of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in the Saudi capital.

    Thus the incident continues to reverberate in the United States and the international arena, even after the Saudi version on the altercation in the consulate. Many parties, including in the regional arena (Turkey, Iran, and Qatar), have no interest in allowing the incident to disappear from the headlines. Presumably the American administration, perhaps for lack of an alternative, has yet to announce it feels the matter is closed. It is doubtful whether President Trump’s attempt to distinguish in the public mindset between the failings of the Saudi leadership on the one hand, and the role assigned to the kingdom of an important and credible strategic partner on the other hand, will succeed enough to reduce the pressure on him to issue a severe response.

    The Khashoggi affair, which is still far from over, poses the most significant challenge to US-Saudi relations since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. At least in one sense it is even more serious, as it challenges Saudi Arabia’s internal stability. At the time of the 2001 attacks in the United States, the royal family was unified and mobilized to preserve their common interests. The royal family that confronts the current incident, however, is not unified, and MBS has many opponents in the religious establishment, as well as among his half-brothers and uncles. Under the collective rule of the Ibn Saud family, which created checks and balances and resulted in a cautious and well thought-out policy that was consistent with Saudi capabilities and interests, MBS has instituted a centralized autonomous rule that employs violent methods to silence opponents.

    The monarchy was surprised by the severity of the responses to the Khashoggi affair in the international community, and as in other cases, appears to have been unprepared to deal with the fallout. Khaled bin Salman, the Saudi ambassador in Washington who is a brother of MBS and from this point on may be designated to play a more central role in the decision making process (that thus far has lacked thought and planning), has been summoned hastily to Riyadh. From a policy perspective, it appears that the King understands that his son the Crown Prince went too far, must be restrained, and must embrace a more thoughtful and cautious policy that will not result in unnecessary criticism at home or abroad. However, the King himself is elderly and ill, and the extent to which he is capable of controlling events is not entirely clear. As a result, concern exists regarding the stability of the kingdom.

    Both Washington and Jerusalem have an interest in stability of the kingdom. Consequently, Riyadh can leverage this asset, and in an effort to distance itself from some of the negative impacts of the Khashoggi affair, may suggest increasing its efforts in the struggle against Iran. It may also attempt to convince the US that there is no alternative to the current leadership regarding the necessary internal reforms, despite a worsening in the major economic parameters since the appointment of MBS as Crown Prince: in 2017 the scope of foreign investments in the kingdom (FDI) was at a 14 year low of $1.4 billion, given the fear of foreign investors and the fact that wealthy Saudis are pulling their money out of the kingdom at an unprecedented rate.

    Against this background, there is clear concern within the US administration that a possible deterioration in relations between the two countries will illustrate that President Trump’s gamble on the Saudi leadership as the backbone of his policy in the Middle East was mistaken. In practice, as the threat to the kingdom’s internal stability continues to rise on the eve of the imposition of a significant round of sanctions on Iran, there are new questions regarding the validity of the United States strategy, which aims to contain Iran in the region by means of a Saudi-led Arab coalition that constitutes the “foot on the ground” that sets in motion operative measures to curb Iran.

    Many in the US and in Israel, motivated by various interests, praised MBS despite the warning signs that began to emerge some time ago. The uncertainty in the kingdom is considerable, and the sensitivity will only increase as the king’s succession draws near. Not only is this first time that the crown is passed to a grandson of the founder of the kingdom (as opposed to a son), but the Crown Prince has acquired many opponents and has yet to stabilize his role. A period of instability in Saudi Arabia and shocks to US-Saudi relations could have a direct and detrimental impact on Israeli interests and Israel’s ability to view Saudi Arabia as a partner in its efforts to pursue common goals.


  • Le forniture di gas rinsaldano la collaborazione tra Egitto e Israele

    Il 19 febbraio, il consorzio israelo-americano che detiene le concessioni di gas naturale nella zona economica esclusiva di Israele (ZEE), compresi i giacimenti di gas Tamar e Leviathan, ha annunciato un accordo con la compagnia egiziana Delphinus, del valore approssimativo di 15 miliardi di dollari. Il 27 settembre 2018, Delek Drilling, parte del consorzio, ha annunciato che East Mediterranean Pipeline (EMED) – il 25% delle cui azioni sono di proprietà di Delek – ha acquistato il 39% della società egiziana Eastern Mediterranean Gas (EMG) per 518 milioni di dollari. EMG è tra i proprietari del gasdotto per il trasporto di gas naturale dall’Egitto verso la Giordania e Israele: un gasdotto trasporta gas in Egitto a el-Arish, da dove il gasdotto si divide in due con una linea da el-Arish ad Aqaba, e una da el-Arish a Ashkelon. I ripetuti danni a questi oleodotti da parte di gruppi terroristici locali hanno interrotto il flusso di gas dall’Egitto ai suoi vicini, sebbene la sezione da el-Arish ad Ashkelon sia rimasta intatta. Come parte dell’accordo, Delek ha acquisito il diritto esclusivo di gestire il gasdotto di 90 km da el-Arish ad Ashkelon. La conclusione finale dell’accordo è subordinata a varie approvazioni governative egiziana e israeliana, controlli operativi e riparazioni e aggiornamenti. In una svolta interessante, l’accordo finale potrebbe anche includere l’uso del gasdotto el-Arish-Aqaba per fornire gas israeliano all’Egitto.

    Con l’acquisto di una partecipazione nel gasdotto egiziano, il consorzio israelo-americano ha assunto il rischioso compito di assicurare l’attuazione dell’accordo di fornitura decennale. Ma al di là degli aspetti economici, ci sono anche implicazioni politiche per l’accordo. Per il momento, gli unici acquirenti non israeliani del gas naturale di Israele sono Egitto, Giordania e palestinesi. Gli accordi con questi tre mercati di esportazione sono commercialmente solidi, ma soggetti a rischi politici e di sicurezza e alla possibile concorrenza commerciale. In assenza di altri mercati disponibili, l’Egitto è il più grande mercato per il gas israeliano, finché risorse proprie non ne soddisfino bisogni (il che, si prevede, non avverrà prima del 2019-2020).

    Gli accordi per vendere gas in Egitto e acquistare un controllo parziale del gasdotto sono particolarmente apprezzati, dato che le altre opzioni per Israele di vendere e trasportare gas naturale sono ora meno praticabili. Il mercato turco sarebbe stato un’opzione interessante per il gas naturale israeliano e del Mediterraneo orientale. Tuttavia, l’imprevedibilità politica dell’attuale regime politico in Turchia, compreso il suo atteggiamento nei confronti di Israele, la mancanza di stabilità politica in Libano e Siria e l’assenza di una soluzione politica al conflitto a Cipro rendono la vendita di gas naturale alla Turchia e l’uso della Turchia come hub troppo rischioso per ragioni politiche e di sicurezza. A sua volta, le instabili condizioni economiche in Turchia riducono l’attrattiva di questa opzione di esportazione. L’idea di estendere un oleodotto dalle coste orientali del Mediterraneo attraverso Cipro alla Grecia appare invece tecnicamente molto difficile e politicamente esposta ai problemi legati alla disputa su Cipro, nonché finanziariamente dipendente dalla disponibilità di altri produttori del Mediterraneo orientale a condividere le proprie capacità con Israele. Un simile progetto creerebbe vantaggi politici ed economici per Israele, in quanto garantirebbe un mercato ampio e stabile, aggiungerebbe una dimensione importante alle relazioni di Israele traballanti con l’Ue e aumenterebbe la stabilità nel Mediterraneo orientale, con tutti i produttori e gli utenti di un simile oleodotto interessato alle entrate derivanti dal suo funzionamento sicuro e continuo

    Pertanto, l’opzione egiziana – sia come mercato o ponte per l’esportazione di gas liquefatto verso l’Europa – è l’unica opzione valida per esportare il gas naturale di Israele. Aggiunge un’altra dimensione allo sviluppo positivo nelle relazioni tra Israele ed Egitto, al di là della stretta cooperazione in materia di sicurezza. Ma comprare una partecipazione nel gasdotto egiziano, oltre alla futura vendita di gas, comporta ancora alcuni rischi. Le attuali relazioni di Israele con l’Egitto sono probabilmente le migliori di sempre, ma l’attuazione degli accordi sul gas è stata firmata da società commerciali soggette alle considerazioni politiche del governo egiziano. Inoltre, le riserve naturali egiziane potrebbero espandersi in modo significativo, e questo a sua volta potrebbe influenzare le considerazioni egiziane riguardanti l’acquisto di gas o la disponibilità di capacità di liquefazione nelle loro installazioni.


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